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SUMMARIES 
An error in the work of W. H. Young is used to 
show how quantification problems still arose after 
uniformity was well understood. 
Bien apr& que les math&matfciens aient dggag6 
la notion d'uniformit6, ils pou.vaient encore commet- 
tre de telles fautes de quantification. On le montre 
ici en considgrant une pxoposition fausse &on&e par 
W. H. Young. 
Errores quantificationis (ut dicitur) post uni- 
formitatem intellectam superfuisse indicat theorema 
falsum a W. H. Youngio propositam. 
Everyone knows how hard it was originally for mathematicians 
to grasp the significance of uniformity in limit questions. Dif- 
ficulties in this area, arising generally from misplaced or mis- 
understood quantifiers, figure in all discussions of the 19th- 
century movement toward greater rigor in analysis. These seem to 
be the only quantification difficulties that historians of math- 
ematics have mentioned. When Grattan-Guinness a few years ago 
wrote about "the historical significance of quantification...in 
the development of mathematical analysis," it was natural for him 
to define his subject as follows: 
I use the term "quantification" in mathematical 
analysis to refer to the techniques of multiple limits, 
where increments are taken on variables denoting real 
numbers and values chosen for suffix variables from 
their ranges (usually the integers) . . ..[Grattan-Guinness 
1975b, 4751 
But logically the topic is broader than this. AII understanding 
of uniform limits as such does not necessarily indicate a grasp 
of the more general problems of quantification, which could and 
did occur in other contexts within analysis. This paper is a 
careful consideration of one such occurrence. 
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Shortly after the turn of the century, W. H. Young publish- 
ed a significant paper on the theory of content IYoung 1904cJ. 
Grattan-Guinness described it as "the first paper heralding the 
Young integral" [Grattan-Guinness 1975a, 48J, and its results 
are discussed in the standard histories of integration IHawkins 
1975, 149-150; Pesin 1970, 82-841. As Pesin says the motive for 
the paper was probably the following theorem, which strengthens 
a result of Arzela: 
THEOREM 4. Given an infinite number of sets of 
intervals, in a finite segment (A,B) of length L, 
such that the content of each set of interva2s is 
greater than some positive quantity g, then a set of 
points of potency c exists, which is intexnal to an 
infinite series of these sets of intervals, and con- 
tains closed components [i.e., subsets] of content 
> g - e0 where e is as small as we please. [Young 
1904c, 201 
In his proof, Young first shows there are twice-covered in- 
tervals of content greater than q-e/2, then inside them inter- 
vals of content greater than g-e/2 - e/4 covered four times, 
and so on. He then passes to the limit using a previous theorem 
on decreasing sequences of such sets. Combining this argument 
with theorems on approximation by sets of intervals (inner con- 
tent), he then asserts the following: 
THE0RF.M 4'. Given an infinite number of sets of 
points G,, G,, . . . . components of a closed set of fi- 
nite content L, such that the upper limit of the con- 
tents of the closed components of Gn is greater than 
some positive quantity g, the same for all values of 
n, then an infinite series of these sets exists, hav- 
ing in common a set of points of potency cI the con- 
tent of whose closed components has an upper limit 
' 9. [Young 1904c, 261 - 
Passing to complements, Young later reaches his final assertion 
along this line: 
THEOREM 7'. Given an infinite number of sets of 
points, components of a set of finite (outer) content 
L, the (outer) contents of these sets having a positive 
upper limit g, then an infinite number of these sets 
exists, which can all be enclosed simultaneously in a 
set of intervals of content < g + e, where e is as 
small as we please. [Young 1904c, 451 
204 William C. Waterhouse HM 10 
NOW the trouble with this last theorem is that it is defi- 
nitely false. Take for instance the interval [O,l] of content 
L = 1. Let E, be the set of numbers in [O,l] whose nth decimal 
digit is nonzero. Then each E, has content 9/10 = g. But as 
the digits of a number are independent, the union of any k of 
the En has content 1 - (l/lOJk. Hence a set of intervals en- 
closing infinitely many of them cannot have content less than 1. 
Theorem 4' is similarly flawed. While it is a plausible state- 
ment, enough so in fact that its proof was proposed as a problem 
just fifteen years ago, it too has been shown to be false 
[Chernoff & Waterhouse 19671. 
Nevertheless, Theorem 4 is true, and its proof is valid. 
Nor is there any error in the intervening approximation arguments. 
The difficulty lies entirely in the meaning assigned to the phrase 
"points . . . internal to an infinite series of these sets." If the 
infinite series of sets is allowed to be different from point to 
point, one has the theorem Young actually proved. Obviously this 
is how Young understood the phrase while working out the quite 
nontrivial proof of Theorem 4. But by the time he came to Theorem 
7’ t he was interpreting the statement as meaning that the infinite 
series could be chosen the same for all points in the set [l]. 
Neither Pesin nor Hawkins points out the error in Young's 
work, so there may be some value just in setting the record 
straight 121. But this is not the main point. Young's mistake 
had no great significance in the development of measure theory. 
Nor is it particularly embarrassing for Young's reputation; not 
many people at that time had a sound intuitive feeling for this 
subject, and a few years later Young could reasonably say that 
"in the Theory of Sets of Points . . . the reasoning is so subtle 
that almost all who have written on it have at one time or another 
stumbled" [Young 1910, 1171. 
What is important historically is the nature of Young's mis- 
take: it is clearly a confusion of quantifier order, just like the 
confusion of continuity with uniform continuity. Yet it was made 
by a good mathematician in the present century, well after the 
proper understanding of uniformity became common knowledge. In- 
deed, Young reproduced his erroneous theorems in a book that also 
contained a perfectly accurate explanation of uniform continuity 
[Young & Young 1906, 114, 2181. About this same time he also 
wrote several solid papers on nonuniform convergence [Young 1904a,b 
19081. This example thus draws to our attention the fact that 
someone clear enough in his own mind about uniformity could still 
have difficulties with quantification elsewhere in analysis. 
The truth is that the difficulties which we analyze as con- 
fusions in quantifier order have long been corrrmon, and not re- 
stricted to mathematics. There is an attractive paper by P. T. 
Geach, "History of a Fallacy," that gives examples from philos- 
ophy over two millenia. Geach's comment on their recurrence is 
equally appropriate for mathematics: 
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. . . in philosophical contexts we cannot see by common 
sense what might be true, and hence conclude that the 
premise could be true and the conclusion false, as we 
can in the simple examples of the fallacy....IGeach 
1972, 21 
Furthermore, scholars smn recognized such problems and de- 
veloped rules for avoiding them in certain contexts. Already in 
the middle ages logicians were dealing with such questions under 
the heading of suppositio [Kneale & Kneale 1962, 259J. TnTilliam 
of Sherwood, for instance, at one time appears to have seen that 
the order of quantification (to use later language 133) was cru- 
cial. But, as Seach says elsewhere, the general significance of 
this idea was not realized: 
William thus fully grasped the difference made by 
a different order of logical procedures; unhappily, he 
used the idea only to solve particular sophismata, and 
never got beyond this ad hoc use to the formulation of 
a general principle. His theory of suppositio is quite 
on the usual lines; and he most likely never suspected 
that the principle he used but did not formulate would 
make the distinction between confused and determinate 
suppositio entirely superfluous. This illustrates what 
Peirce called "the damnable particularity" of medieval 
logicians-- that tendency to develop ad hoc solutions, 
as opposed to general theories, which did so much to 
make their genius sterile. [Geach 1980, 132J 
Similarly unsystematic approaches can still be found as late as 
the early work of Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics, 
19031, but Geach shows that none of these attempts can have more 
than a limited range of validity [Geach 1972, g-121. 
What we must realize is that the treatment of "quantifica- 
tion" problems in 19th-century mathematics was also limited to 
specific contexts. There were counterexamples to seemingly true 
assertions and repeated misunderstandings in particular areas. 
These forced mathematicians to pay careful attention to certain 
topics: not so much to quantification in general, but to certain 
limit statements where (as we would say now) the order of quan- 
tifiers was significant. Uniformity became a familiar concept, 
helped by an intuitive feeling for "uniform" behavior 141. But 
mathematicians would think of it only in connection with state- 
ments involving real or complex variables approaching limits. 
Though the concept of uniformity contained seeds of generality, 
it was still far from a full logical treatment of the problems 
of quantification. 
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NOTES 
This work was supported in part by National Science Founda- 
tion Grant MCS 8102967. 
1. Apart from the greater generality of the sets, the proof 
Young gives for Theorem 4' is basically the same as the proof for 
Theorem 4. My own belief is that Young formulated Theorem 4' 
without realizing how strongly its statement differs from Theorem 
4. Other interpretations are possible; even the wording of The- 
orem 4 is a bit ambiguous, and thus the quantifiers might have 
been a bit unclear in Young's mind from the beginning. 
2. Hawkins' book gives a statement of Young's theorem along 
the lines of Theorem 4'. I noted a problem with this when I re- 
viewed the book [Waterhouse 19721, but at that time I had not 
read all of Young's paper to find the source of the confusion. 
3. According to the Oxford English Dictionary s.v., it was 
William Hamilton who around 1840 first used the word "quantifica- 
tion" to mean the employment of "some," "all," or the like. This 
Hamilton was a Scottish philosopher (1788-18561, not to be con- 
fused with the William Rowan Hamilton (1805-1865) who discovered 
quaternions. 
4. The connotations of the German word gleichmksig are 
slightly different but are equally natural in this context. 
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